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Abstract
In this paper we make two contributions to the growing literature on \citizen-candidate"
models of representative democracy. First, we add uncertainty about the total vote count.
We show that in a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the election is
uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding oÆce, there
will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate. Second,
we introduce a new concept of equilibrium, which we term \sincere-strategic," and we
show that with this renement, the two equilibrium candidates will not be too extreme,
one will lean to the left and the other one to the right.
JEL classication numbers: D72
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1 Introduction
In a representative democracy, citizens elect representatives who in turn, choose
policies for the society. Traditional models divide the members of the society
into two classes: voters, whose only political role is to vote, and politicians or
political parties (often just two of them), who compete in the election. “Citizen-
Candidate” models of the electoral process, on the other hand, explain how
politicians emerge from the class of voters. In these models, some citizens
become politicians by choosing to run as candidates in an election. The number
and policy preferences of the candidates who run in equilibrium are determined
by three factors: the policy preferences of every citizen, the benefits of holding
oﬃce, and the cost of running for election.
The standard citizen-candidate models suﬀer from a simplistic assumption
that leads to unrealistic predictions. The assumption is that candidates can
perfectly anticipate the outcome of the election and forecast exactly how many
votes each candidate will receive. This assumption leads to the prediction that
two candidates will run against each other only if they have the exact same
number of supporters in the electorate. In models with a finite electorate,
this implies that typically there will be a two-candidate equilibrium only if
the number of citizens is even, because if it is odd, one of the candidates will
generally have at least one more supporter than the other.
We solve this problem and assure political competition in the model by
introducing uncertainty in the electoral outcome, and then showing that in a
society with a large electorate, equilibria with one candidate do not exist, while
equilibria with two candidates always exist. We model the uncertainty as in
Myerson (1993): Citizens choose which candidate to support, but each citizen
has a small probability of failing to convert her intention to support a candidate
into an actual valid, counted vote for the candidate -perhaps the voter is unable
to make it to the polling station, or she misuses the voting equipment and casts
an invalid ballot. This individual probability of being unable to cast a valid
vote generates an aggregate uncertainty about the total vote count.
The aggregate uncertainty about the electoral outcome crucially aﬀects elec-
tions with a large electorate. Candidates decide to run based on the support
they have in the electorate at the time they make the decision to run. However,
elections are not deterministic: the aggregate uncertainty makes the outcome
stochastic and a candidate who initially had less support may ultimately collect
more votes and win the election. If the most popular candidate enters the race,
another citizen with slightly less support will also run, in the hope of an upset
victory. As a result, in a society with a large enough electorate, one-candidate
equilibria do not exist, whereas two-candidate equilibria always exist, regard-
less of the exact number of citizens. These predictions are similar to those in
Osborne and Slivinski’s (1996) model of Citizen-Candidates, but Osborne and
Slivinski work only with an infinite number of sincere voters, who have rather
restricted preferences. Our model, by contrast, allows for any finite number of
citizens, who vote strategically and may have quite general forms of preferences.
The uncertainty assumed in our model has a large eﬀect unless the elec-
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torate is very small. In the case of a small electorate (on the order of a few
dozens of voters), the predictions of our model are similar to those of Besley
and Coate (1997): The existence of equilibria with one or two candidates de-
pends on whether the number of citizens is odd or even.
There are two other papers incorporating uncertainty to a model of citizen-
candidates: In Riviere’s paper (2000), a group of citizens learn their policy
preference only after candidacies are announced, so the location of the median
is uncertain at the time of the announcement. Our model diﬀers from Riviere’s
both in the assumptions we use and the results we obtain. In words of the au-
thor, Riviere’s assumptions are “very restrictive” and in her citizen-candidate
model, two-candidate equilibria are “very rare.”1 Our model relaxes and gen-
eralizes most of Riviere’s assumptions and shows that under mild conditions,
equilibria with two candidates exist.
Roemer (2003) tackles the problem of indeterminacy of equilibria in Besley
and Coate’s model, advocating a particular refinement (Party-Unanimity Nash
Equilibrium or PUNE) that yields a smaller but non-empty set of equilibria. In
Roemer’s paper, uncertainty is only a side issue. He assumes that each candidate
wins with a probability equal to the candidate’s share of votes.
We address indeterminacy by oﬀering a criterion to select equilibria: A re-
finement of our equilibrium concept relaxes the assumption that citizens are
strategic in their voting behavior, and requires an equilibrium to hold regard-
less of whether citizens choose a candidate to support strategically or sincerely.
We will show that under this Sincere-Strategic Equilibrium concept, all candi-
dates must receive a similar share of electoral support and that if there are only
two, one will lean left and the other one will lean right, but they will not be too
extreme.
The rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present our model of
citizen-candidates with uncertainty. In Section 3 we characterize equilibria with
one and two candidates and we discuss equilibria with three or more candidates.
We summarize the findings of the paper and propose an agenda for future re-
search in Section 4. An Appendix contains technical matters omitted from the
text.
2 The Model
Let N be a society formed by N citizens labeled i ∈ N ={1, ..., N}. This society
must elect a representative, who will receive a benefit b from being elected and
will also get to choose a policy in a unidimensional policy space [0, 1]. The
implemented policy we denote by p. Citizens have diﬀerent preferences over the
chosen policy; let vi(p) be the utility that citizen i derives from policy p ∈ [0, 1].
Each agent in the society can run as a candidate in the election, but doing
so entails a cost c, which is small compared to the rewards from holding oﬃce.
1Riviere also considers a game in which like-minded citizens can share the cost of running,
forming a political party. In this setting, equilibria with two parties are no longer rare, but
for some values of the cost of running, only equilibria with one or three candidates exist.
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Formally, we assume that b > 2c.
Let Ii = 1 if i runs as a candidate and zero otherwise, and let Wi = 1 if i
runs as a candidate and wins the election and zero otherwise.
Then the utility of agent i is:
U(p, Ii,Wi) = vi(p) + b ∗Wi − c ∗ Ii.
The game has three stages:
In the first stage or entry stage, each citizen simultaneously decides whether
or not to enter the race and become a candidate. If no candidate enters the
race, then the game ends and a default policy p0 is implemented.
In stage two or support stage, each citizen decides to support one of the
candidates. Citizens who are indiﬀerent toward all the candidates support no
candidate. Each citizen i who supports candidate j casts a valid vote for j with
probability (1− µ). With probability µ, citizen i is unable to cast a valid vote
for any candidate, so i0s support is lost. This probability µ is the same for
each citizen and it is uncorrelated among citizens. The intuition is that citizen
i supports j and intends to vote for j, but with probability µ, some reason
prevents citizen i from casting a valid vote; perhaps i cannot make it to the
polls, or i votes but somehow the ballot is cast incorrectly and is later declared
invalid and does not add to the total vote count.
In stage three, once all valid votes are counted, a winner is elected by plu-
rality rule: the candidate who has valid most votes (not necessarily the one
with most intended support), wins the election and implements her ideal policy.
In case of a tie, the winner is randomly determined among all candidates with
most votes.
Citizens know the ideal policy of each candidate and they correctly anticipate
that the winner will implement her ideal policy; candidates cannot commit at
the entry stage to implement any other policy but their favorite one if they win
the election. Empirical evidence indicates that, indeed, voters merely elect the
policy they prefer among those oﬀered by the competing candidates, without
being able to influence how the winning candidate chooses policy.2
The uncertainty about the vote count captures the idea that candidates
cannot anticipate the outcome of the election, because they do not have enough
information about the electorate. The candidates cannot anticipate whose vote
will count and whose will not, so even though they anticipate the support in-
tentions of the whole electorate, they are still uncertain about the electoral
outcome.
The strategy of each citizen i has two components: An entry strategy, de-
termining whether to run as a candidate or not, and a support strategy, which
determines for any possible set of candidates which one will citizen i support.
Let Ii ∈ {0, 1} denote citizen i’s entry strategy, where Ii = 1 denotes entry
and let I = (I1, ..., IN ) be the entry strategy profile of all the citizens. The set
of candidates resulting from the entry strategy I is C ⊆ N . Let σi : 2N −→ N
denote the support strategy used by citizen i. Let σ = (σ1, ..., σN ) be the support
2See Lee, Moretti and Butler (2004).
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strategy profile of every citizen in the society and let σ−i be the strategy profile
of every citizen other than i.
The equilibrium concept we use is Undominated Subgame Perfect Nash Equi-
librium in pure strategies, ruling out weakly dominated strategies. An equilib-
rium is defined by an entry strategy profile I∗ and a support strategy profile σ∗
such that:
(i) Given any set of candidates C ⊆ N , σ∗(C) is an Undominated Pure Nash
equilibrium at the support stage.3
(ii) Given σ∗, the entry strategy profile I∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium at the
entry decision stage of the game.
We let C∗ denote the set of candidates who run in the equilibrium {I∗, σ∗}.
We assume that each agent i has a unique favorite policy pi = argmax
p∈[0,1]
vi(p)
and we label and order individuals according to their favorite policy, so that for
all i, j ∈ N , i < j implies pi ≤ pj. Given this ordering of citizens, we assume
that the preference profile satisfies the Strict Single-Crossing property:
Definition 1 A preference profile satisfies the Strict Single-Crossing property if
for all x, y ∈ [0, 1] and all i, j ∈ N such that y > x and j > i, vi(y) ≥ vi(x) =⇒
vj(y) > vj(x).
This property implies that if a “left-leaning” citizen l prefers the right-most
of two policies, then every citizen who is more right-leaning than l also prefers
the right-most policy. Given two policies, one more liberal, one more conserva-
tive, there cannot be any overlapping so that “conservative” citizens support the
liberal policy and some more “liberal” citizens support the conservative policy:
With strictly single-crossing preferences, given any two policy positions p0 < p00,
there exists a cut-oﬀ point bp(p0, p00) such that every citizen with an ideal policy
below bp(p0, p00) prefers p0 to p00 and every citizen with an ideal policy abovebp(p0, p00) prefers p00.
Borrowing the terminology of the Poole and Rosenthal (1985) Nominate
Scores model, single-crossing preferences imply “perfect voting”: The voting
behavior of a citizen-voter faced with a binary choice should be perfectly ex-
plained by the position of the citizen in the unidimensional “low-to-high” scale.
Poole (2005) notes that in practice, more than 90% of the votes in US Congress
can be explained by the position of a legislator in a one-dimensional policy
space.4
We introduce the following notation:
Let m denote the median voter if N is odd, and let ml and mh denote the
two medians if N is even. Labelling citizens by the relative position of their ideal
policy from lowest to highest, m is the citizen in position N+12 if such fraction
3With positive uncertainty, µ > 0, any weakly dominated support strategy is also strictly
dominated in the support subgame and the set of Undominated Nash Equilibria coincides
with the set of Nash Equilibria.
4This is merely suggestive, since we have in mind elections with electorates of any size and
Poole refers to votes in the US Congress, whose size from 1789 on has never exceeded 525.
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is an integer; otherwise ml and mh are respectively the citizens in positions N2
and N+22 .
Let Si(C,σ) denote the support for candidate i, that is, the number of cit-
izens whose support strategy is to support candidate i, given that the set of
candidates is C and the joint strategy profile is σ.
Let Vi denote the number of valid votes for i. Therefore, the diﬀerence Si−Vi
corresponds to the number of citizens who support i but are unable to cast a
valid vote for i and can be interpreted as the number of “lost votes” for i.
In any race with two candidates C = {i, j} with ideal policies pi, pj , let bpij
denote the cut-oﬀ point such that every citizen with an ideal policy less than bpij
prefers the candidate with a lower ideal policy, every citizen with an ideal policy
above bpij prefers the candidate with the higher ideal policy, and only citizens
with an ideal policy equal to bpij are indiﬀerent between i and j.
Note that if pm < bpij , the median prefers the candidate with the low ideal
policy; say it is candidate i. Then i will have more support than j and i would
win the election if there were no uncertainty about the vote totals given the level
of support. If no votes were lost, the margin of victory for i would be Si − Sj .
In the actual outcome of the election, if i loses more votes than j, there is a
“shift” in the results that favors candidate j and the margin of victory for i is
only Vi − Vj . If the diﬀerence in lost votes is big enough to oﬀset the diﬀerence
in initial support, j wins the election.5
In any two-candidate race with C = {i, j}, let
Xij = (Si − Sj)− (Vi − Vj) = (Si − Vi)− (Sj − Vj)
denote the “shift” from candidate i to candidate j in the diﬀerence of voting
totals for the two candidates, compared to the original diﬀerence in support for
the two candidates prior to the distortion introduced by the loss of votes. In
short, Xij is equal to the number votes lost by i minus the number of votes lost
by j.
Xij is a discrete random variable: Let fij(x) be its probability mass function
and let Fij(x) be its distribution function, so fij(x) is the probability that
Xij = x and Fij(x) =
xP
k=0
fij(k).6
Note that in a race with two candidates i and j, in which i has x more
supporters, the probability that i wins the election is
Fij(x− 1) +
1
2
fij(x).
We are now ready to present our results.
5We can interpret our model as a simplified probabilistic voting model, in which we don’t
need exogenous non-policy preferences on the part of the voters to generate uncertainty about
the electoral outcome.
6Let bi[n, q; k] be the probability that a binomial bi[n, q] takes a value of k. Then:
fij(x) =
N−1X
k=0
bi[Si, µ; k + x]bi[Sj , µ; k].
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3 Equilibria
Let us first present the benchmark case in which there no uncertainty about
the vote count (µ = 0) and the candidates can anticipate the outcome of the
election.7
A single candidate equilibrium exists if and only if N is odd, whereas two
candidate equilibria generically do not exist if N is odd and they exist if N is
even.8 Equilibria with multiple candidates are also possible.
These diﬀerences depending on the exact number of citizens are plausible in
an election with a small electorate, such as a vote in a committee. However, in
any election with a very large electorate, there will be some uncertainty about
the number of votes each candidate will get and the results of the model should
not depend on whether the size of the electorate is odd or even.
In the rest of the paper, we capture the uncertainty assuming that µ > 0 and
we show that if the electorate is suﬃciently large, whether N is odd or even is
irrelevant for the existence of equilibria with one or two candidates in elections
with a large reward for holding oﬃce.
3.1 Single Candidate Equilibrium
In a unidimensional space, a unique median is a Condorcet winner and will
have more support (and more expected vote share) than the other competitor
in any two-candidate race. Nevertheless, the uncertainty about the vote totals
gives any other candidate challenging the median some positive probability of
winning the election.
Suppose that citizen m+ 1, the next citizen after the median, runs against
the median m in a two-candidate race. Then the median and everyone to her
left support m and the rest of the society supports m+1. As a result, candidate
m+ 1 trails the median by one in terms of support.
If the median m loses one more vote than m+ 1, the shift Xm,m+1 in favor
of m+1 equals one and the election is tied. If Xm,m+1 is bigger than one, then
m+ 1 wins the election.
Similarly, for any citizen h > m running against the median, every citizen
with an ideal policy above the cutting point bpm,h will support j, and the rest
will support the median. Suppose this means the median has k more supporters.
Then j would need a shift in his favor of k to tie the election and an even larger
shift to win outright.
If the probability that there is such a big enough shift in favor of the weaker
candidate is suﬃciently high given the incentives to run (benefits of holding oﬃce
and choosing policy), then a weaker candidate will be willing to run against the
median.
We obtain the following result:
7This benchmark corresponds to the Besley and Coate (1997) model with the additional
assumptions of strict single-crossing preferences in a unidimensional policy space, and b > 2c.
8This is mentioned in Eguia (2003).
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Lemma 1 There exists a single candidate equilibrium if and only if N is odd,
the median is unique, and for any citizen j ∈ N\m,
(b+ vj(pj)− vj(pm)) Pr[Wj = 1|C = {m, j}] ≤ c.
In this equilibrium the median runs unopposed.9
This and all other proofs are shown in the Appendix.
Now note that as the electorate gets larger, the number of lost votes will
increase. A candidate trailing by a small number of supporters will almost
certainly lose if the electorate is also small, but a candidate trailing by the same
small number of supporters will have a better chance of victory if the electorate
is large and the diﬀerence in support is slim relative to the number of votes
that can be lost. For instance, in an electorate with 5 citizens, a 3-2 split of
support will give the weaker candidate a very small chance of victory. However,
in an electorate with millions of citizens, a split of support in which the stronger
candidate has only one more supporter is a virtual tie, and both candidates have
an almost equal probability of victory.
In fact, for any fixed finite diﬀerence in support, if µ > 0 the probability of
victory converges to a half for both candidates as the electorate gets larger. We
use this result for our first theorem on existence of single candidate equilibrium
in large societies.
Theorem 1 If the electorate is suﬃciently large, then there is no single candi-
date equilibrium.
Suppose the benefit of holding oﬃce is three times the cost of running. Then
any candidate with a one-third chance of victory will be willing to run. The
probability of victory for a weaker candidate with one less supporter than the
median is more than a third if N ≥ 103 for µ = 0.05; or if N ≥ 1087 for
µ = 0.005. Since void ballots exceed 0.5% in most elections, these numerical
examples show that the theorem applies for relatively small electorates. A
higher degree of uncertainty about counting an individual vote has the same
eﬀect as increasing the size of the population: In either case it becomes harder
for the agents to anticipate the outcome of the election and a challenger will
have greater incentives to run against the median.
In an election with a small electorate the median can run unopposed because
any other candidate would have only a very slim chance of beating the median.
The median must be unique to run unopposed, so it is crucial that the electorate
is odd. However, as the electorate gets larger, the uncertainty about the vote
count gives other candidates challenging the median a better chance of winning,
and for a suﬃciently large society the probability of victory for citizens with an
ideal point close to the median is high enough so that they will run and not let
the median win unopposed, not even a unique, Condorcet winner median.
9The probability Pr[Wj = 1|C = {m, j}] is:
(i) 1
2
fmj(2k + 1) + 1− Fmj(2k + 1) if bpm,j ∈ (pm−k−1, pm−k) ∪ (pm+k, pm+k+1)
or (ii) 1
2
fmj(2k) + 1− Fmj(2k) if bpm,j ∈ {pm−k, pm+k}, for a positive integer k.
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3.2 Two-candidate equilibria
Two candidates are a common feature of plurality elections, yet they are gener-
ically non-existent in a model without uncertainty if the number of citizens is
finite and odd. We show that introducing uncertainty in the model guarantees
the existence of two-candidate equilibria in every society with a large electorate.
Without uncertainty, a joint support strategy profile such that an entering
third candidate receives no support from any other citizen is usually part of
a two-candidate equilibrium: No third candidate enters because no one would
support the entrant, and no one supports the entrant because since no one else
does, supporting the doomed entrant is a waste.
With uncertainty, an entrant with no supporters still has a positive probabil-
ity of victory. Suppose i is an arbitrary citizen who sincerely prefers the entrant.
If citizen i is indiﬀerent or almost indiﬀerent between the two top candidates,
then i might want to deviate from the proposed equilibrium support strategy
and support the entrant. Citizen i then forfeits the chance of tilting the election
in favor of one of the top two candidates. As the size of the electorate increases,
the probability that the entrant with a single supporter wins given that a sin-
gle vote decides the election converges towards zero; if the electorate is large
and i still supports the entrant, i is wasting his support on a candidate who is
asymptotically hopeless even on narrow elections decided by a single vote.10
We introduce an assumption ruling out the sort of preferences according to
which some citizen is willing to be the only one supporting a virtually hopeless
candidate: given any three candidates such that two of them receive enough
support to be willing to run against each other, no citizen wants to be the sole
supporter of the third candidate. Informally, each citizen thinks: “If no one
supports the weak candidate, neither will I.” We formalize this idea as a “No
Lone Supporter” Assumption:
Assumption 1 (No Lone Supporter) Given an arbitrary support strategy σ,
let {l, r} be any pair of citizens willing to run a two-candidate race against
each other and let h, i ∈ N . Suppose that given σ, if the set of candidates is
C = {l, r, h}, no citizen in N\{h, i} supports h. Then, given C = {l, r, h} and
σ−i, to support h is not a best response for i.
No Lone Supporter is a joint assumption on preferences and the size of the
electorate, becoming less restrictive as the size of the electorate increases. With
preferences satisfying No Lone Supporter, for any two candidates willing to run
against each other, there exists an equilibrium support strategy by all citizens in
which no citizen would support an entrant. We only need to add the restriction
that no citizen is willing to become a candidate if no other citizen would support
her. We refer to this assumption as “Minimal Support”.
Assumption 2 (Minimal Support) Given any entry and support strategy profile
of all citizens other than i such that none of them would support i if i run as a
10Citizen i only takes into account outcomes decided by a single vote when considering
which candidate to support, because in any other outcome i0s support is irrelevant.
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candidate, citizen i prefers not to run. Formally, ∀i ∈ N , given any {I−i, σ−i}
s.t. Si(I−i, I 0i, σ−i, σ
0
i) ≤ 1 for any {I 0i,σ0i}, I∗i = 0 in any best response {I∗i , σ∗i }
of i to {I−i, σ−i}.
For equilibria with two candidates, Minimal Support places a very mild
restriction on the reward b, the cost c and the preference profile to avoid entry
by an unsupported third candidate. Since a third candidate with no supporters
is not drawing support away from other candidates, she only aﬀects the outcome
of the election if she wins, and with no supporters the probability that she wins
is virtually zero. Minimal Support merely requires that given such a negligible
probability of obtaining a benefit from running for oﬃce, a candidate with no
supporters would rather not participate in the election and not pay the cost of
running. With multiple candidates, Minimal Support has stronger implications,
as we shall discuss in the next subsection.
With these two assumptions we can focus our attention on finding two candi-
dates i and j who would want to run against each other for oﬃce. Then we can
construct an equilibrium with these two candidates in which no citizen would
support an entrant and no third citizen will enter the race.
Theorem 2 Suppose the No Lone Supporter and the Minimal Support assump-
tions hold. Then if the electorate is suﬃciently large, a two-candidate equilibrium
exists.
The proof is constructive. If there is a unique median, in the absence of
uncertainty (or with little uncertainty in small electorates), two-candidate equi-
libria do not exist unless the median citizen is indiﬀerent between the two candi-
dates, an event that generically does not occur. The probability that a stronger
candidate with just one more supporter wins the election is very high, and
trailing candidates will be discouraged at the long odds against them.
However, as the electorate grows, a positive uncertainty raises the probabil-
ity that a candidate trailing by one vote will win. If there are large benefits of
holding oﬃce, the same intuition that denied the existence of single candidate
equilibria for large societies guarantees the existence of two-candidate equilibria
for large electorates: In a large electorate, the probability that a weaker candi-
date trailing by a finite number of supporters will win the election is close to one
half, and b > 2c guarantees that such a weaker candidate will want to run, and
that equilibria with two candidates exist in large societies, whether the number
of citizens is even or odd.
Now that we have guaranteed existence for large electorates, we proceed to
characterize the equilibria with two candidates i and j, for the generic case in
which no citizen is indiﬀerent between two distinct ideal policies.
Assumption 3 (No Indiﬀerence) For any i, j, l ∈ N such that pi 6= pj , vl(pi) 6=
vl(pj).
Without further loss of generality, assume i < j, so pi ≤ pj . Let then q(x)
be the minimum number of supporters that i must have in order for i to win
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with probability no less than x, given that every other citizen will support j.
That is, q(x) is the minimum k such that
Pr[Wi = 1|C = {i, j}, Si = k, Sj = N − k] ≥ x.
Two candidates i and j can run in equilibrium if both have enough supporters
to have a high enough probability of winning.
Proposition 2 Suppose the No Lone Supporter, Minimal Support and No In-
diﬀerence assumptions hold. Then there exists a two-candidate equilibrium in
which i and j run against each other if and only if:bpij ∈ (pL, pH), where L = q( cb+vi(pi)−vi(pj) ) and H = q(1− cb+vj(pj)−vj(pi) ),
L,H ∈ N .11
There is a two-candidate equilibrium if both candidates get a similar number
of supporters and thus they both have a suﬃcient probability of winning. In
order for the electorate to split in roughly equal halves, the cutting point bpij
between those who support i and those who support j must be close to the
median. Proposition 2 shows that in particular, it has to be in between the
ideal point of citizens L and H, where the identity of L and H is specified using
the function q(x).
Since i is the candidate with a lower ideal policy, in order for i to run, it
must be that (at least) the first L citizens support i. But since b > 2c, candidate
i is willing to run for a probability of victory which is less than a half. It follows
that citizen L is a citizen weakly to the left of the median m (if N is odd) or of
the low median ml (if N is even), for if the median or lower median support i,
the probability of victory for i is at least a half. Similarly, H is a citizen weakly
to the right of the median or the high median mh. Suppose N is even. Then
it follows bpml,mh ∈ (pml, pmh) ⊆ (pL, pH), thus there exists a two-candidate
equilibrium in which ml and mh run against each other.
Corollary 3 Under the No Lone Supporter and Minimal Support assumptions,
if N is even a two-candidate equilibrium exists.
If the reward for holding oﬃce is big, in a small society with an odd number
of citizens, equilibria with two candidates typically do not exist. On the other
hand, in a society with a large, or a small but even number of citizens, there
always exists a two-candidate equilibrium.
We now address the question of convergence to the median: In our construc-
tive proof of Theorem 2, the median(s) or a citizen very close to the median are
the two candidates in equilibrium. However, this need not be the case: Two
very extreme candidates i and j can run in equilibrium, insofar as the cutting
point bpij is very close to the median, (or to the medians if N is even).
In an equilibrium without uncertainty (µ = 0), the two candidates must have
equal support. With uncertainty, we only require that they have similar, not
11Without No Indiﬀerence, bpij ∈ (pL, pH) is a suﬃcient condition and bpij ∈ [pL, pH ] a
necessary one. We sketch the proof of this claim in the Appendix.
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necessarily equal support. In larger societies, the margin by which the weaker
candidate trails in support may be bigger in absolute terms, but the fraction
of the population that supports each candidate should converge to a half in a
two-candidate equilibrium as the electorate gets larger. If the weaker candidate
lags heavily in support, he should abandon the race.
The cutting point bpij will have to be close to the median in order for the
candidates to have similar support. But the candidates themselves need not
be close to the median. We do not have a convergence result in terms of the
policy that will ultimately be implemented, but only in terms of the “undecided
voter”, the citizen who is indiﬀerent between the two candidates. This citizen
(if it exists) ought to be close to the median, splitting the electorate into two
halves of roughly the same size, so that both candidacies are competitive.
The two candidates can be two moderates, or two extremists (one from each
extreme), or anything in between so long as they split society into two simi-
larly big groups. To address this multiplicity of equilibria, we select equilibria
according to their robustness to the assumption on citizens’ support behavior.
We introduce a new concept of equilibrium, which allows for both strategic and
sincere support behavior on the part of the agents.
Definition 2 A Sincere-Strategic Equilibrium is a pair {I∗, σ∗} such that:
(i) The support strategy profile σ∗ is an Undominated Pure Nash Equilibrium
of the support stage for any set of candidates C ⊆ N .
(ii) The entry strategy profile I∗ is a Pure Nash Equilibrium at the entry
stage given any subset E ⊆ N such that at the support stage every citizen i ∈ E
follows the strategy σ∗i and every citizen j /∈ E follows a sincere support strategy.
In a Sincere-Strategic equilibrium, the set of candidates C∗ must be the
equilibrium outcome of the entry stage regardless of whether every citizen acts
strategically or sincerely in the support stage. Furthermore, C∗ must also be
the equilibrium outcome of the entry stage if any subset of agents deviate from
the strategic equilibrium and choose whom to support sincerely.
Published estimates of the incidence of strategic voting behavior in the US
and the UK (two countries that elect a single representative per district) range
between 5% and 17%, as reported by Alvarez and Nagler (2000). Our Sincere-
Strategic equilibrium is a Strategic equilibrium which is robust at the entry
stage to deviations towards sincerity by any coalition of agents. While it is
diﬃcult for citizens to coordinate strategically, it is easier to hypothesize how
they might be convinced as a group to vote sincerely: An appeal by a candidate
simply to the “honesty” of the citizens, to “vote according to your heart” might
convince a large number of voters to deviate from the equilibrium strategic be-
havior more readily than a complicated appeal to coordinate on a sophisticated
deviation. Our refined equilibrium concept requires the equilibrium to be robust
to successful appeals to sincerity.
It is trivial to note that every single candidate equilibrium is a Sincere-
Strategic equilibrium: In a single candidate equilibrium, citizens automatically
elect the only candidate and if a second candidate entered the race, with two
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candidates strategic support is equivalent to sincere support. Therefore, whether
citizens choose whom to support sincerely or strategically does not alter the
entry decision of any citizen when there is a single candidate running.
However, if there are two candidates running, citizens who act sincerely
may support an entrant who would have been shunned if all citizens acted
strategically.
In particular, note that a two-candidate equilibrium with two extreme can-
didates cannot be a sincere-strategic equilibrium, because a moderate entrant
could gather a significant amount of support, enough to have a high enough
probability of victory. Thus some convergence is necessary for a sincere-strategic
equilibrium.
Nevertheless, full convergence is not possible: Two adjacent candidates
would also fail to stand in a two-candidate sincere-strategic equilibrium, be-
cause another adjacent candidate, just a little bit more extreme than either of
the two original ones can enter and outflanking one of the candidates, get the
support of almost a half of the electorate. For example, if ml and mh were
running, then mh+ 1 can run, and under sincere supporting behavior, get the
support of N2 − 1 citizens, leaving ml with
N
2 supporters and mh with just his
own support.
Remark 4 Sincere-Strategic equilibria with two candidates will consist of a left-
leaning candidate and a right-leaning candidate, satisfying three conditions:
(i) They are both separate from the median,
(ii) they are not too far from each other,
(iii) and they split society into two groups with roughly the same number of
supporters.
The candidates have to be separate from the median to make an extreme
third candidacy inviable: If a third candidate entered to the left of the left-
leaning candidate, the right-leaning candidate would win if enough leftist citi-
zens were sincere and the left vote is split, or else the entrant would have no
support and would not aﬀect the election (if citizens are strategic).
They cannot be too far from each other (too extreme) or else a moderate
third candidate would enter in between them and the entrant would sweep the
election if citizens chose support sincerely.
The two candidates have to split society into two roughly equal groups of
support to be both viable candidates with a good chance of winning the election.
In the Appendix we show a set of suﬃcient assumptions that guarantee
the existence of a Sincere Strategic equilibrium with two candidates in a large
electorate. These assumptions include Euclidean preferences, two mild restric-
tions on the distribution of ideal policies, which we want to be somewhat evenly
spread and not too clumped near the median, and a more restrictive assumption
on the cost of running as a candidate, which we require to be high enough to
deter entry by candidates with no chance of winning.
Here we just introduce an example:
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Example 1 Let there be 100 citizens, with ideal policies pi = i100 for all i ∈{1, 2, ...100}. Let the policy preferences be:
vi(p) =
½
−0.1(pi − p) if p ≤ pi.
−0.101(p− pi) if p > pi.
¾
so every citizen i prefers the candidate who is closest to i and in case of equal
distance, the candidate with the lower ideal policy. Let uncertainty µ = 0.025
and let b = 10c = 10.
Then, in any two candidate Sincere-Strategic equilibrium with C = {i, j}:
Either (i, j) ∈ {(47, 53), (48, 53)} or i ∈ {17, 18, ..., 47}, j ∈ {54, 55...83},
(i+j)
2 ∈ [49, 51.5], and |i− j| ≤ 64.
We provide calculations in the Appendix. This example illustrates the result:
If two candidates run against each other, one will be left-of-the-median, one will
be right-of-the-median, they will not be too extreme, and there will be some
gap between them.
3.3 Equilibria with 3 or more candidates
Equilibria with multiple candidates are possible in our model.
Models without uncertainty can distinguish between “winning candidates”
(those who win with positive probability) and “spoilers” (those who run just to
aﬀect the outcome indirectly, but with no probability of actually winning). With
uncertainty, every candidate has some positive probability of victory, albeit
possibly a very small one, regardless of the support they have. Nevertheless, we
can still describe some candidates as spoilers: Those who trail in support and
run mostly to influence who wins when they lose.
Formally, we can define “competitive candidates” as those who have enough
of an incentive to run based just on their probability of winning, without taking
into account the eﬀect that their candidacy would have on the electoral outcome
if they lose. Competitiveness is defined relative to a specific joint strategy of
all citizens at the support stage; thus a candidate can be competitive for some
profile of support and not competitive given a diﬀerent support profile.
Definition 3 Given a joint support strategy profile σ, a candidate i ∈ C is
competitive if
{b+ vi(pi)−
X
k∈C\i
vi(pk) Pr[Wk = 1|C\i]}Pr[Wi = 1|C] > c,
and a spoiler otherwise.
Competitive candidates run to win. Spoiler candidates run motivated by the
advantages that running for a defeat entails for them.
Remark 5 In order for a pair {I∗, σ∗} to be a multiple-candidate equilibrium,
three conditions must hold:
14
(i) Every candidate i ∈ C∗ prefers the lottery over outcomes with the set of
candidates C∗, better than the lottery over outcomes if i drops out and the set
of candidates is C∗\i.12
(ii) No other citizen wants to enter the race.
(iii) Every citizen j ∈ N supporting i ∈ C∗ prefers the lottery over outcomes
given C∗ and σ∗ to the lottery that results if j deviates and supports some other
candidate.
We present an example of a Sincere-Strategic equilibrium with three candi-
dates.
Example 2 Let there be 183 citizens with Euclidean preferences vi(p) = |p−pi|.
Let b = 4c = 4. Let p31 = 0.2; p61 = 0.25; p62 = 0.4; pm = 0.5; p122 = 0.6;
p123 = 0.76; p153 = 0.8. Finally, let uncertainty be µ = 0.01.
Denote citizen 31 by l and citizen 153 by r. Then there exists a Sincere-
Strategic equilibrium in which C∗ = {l,m, r}.
In this equilibrium, every citizen sincerely supports the candidate with the
closest ideal policy. With Euclidean preferences and no uncertainty, under mild
assumptions three candidate equilibria do not exist (Besley and Coate); in Ex-
ample 2 if µ = 0, citizen 62 would prefer to change her support from the median
to the leftist candidate, giving l the victory in the election. However, with
uncertainty µ = 0.01, if citizen 62 supports the left candidate, then the three
candidates {l,m, r} have a total support of 62, 60 and 61, respectively. With
these support totals, l wins the election with probability close to 81%, but r
wins with probability above 18%, whereas the median wins only with probabil-
ity close to 1%. Citizen 62 would rather let each of the three candidates have
an equal opportunity of victory than to almost completely sacrifice the chance
to win of his favorite candidate while not quite securing that his second-best
candidate will win.13 Similar calculations show that citizens 61, 122 and 123
(the most tempted to support their second best) also prefer to sincerely support
their most preferred candidate.
This example can easily be extended to a large electorate: Let us introduce
n new agents, a sixth of them with an ideal policy below pl, another sixth with
ideal policies between pl and p61, another sixth with ideal policies between p62
and pm, another sixth with ideal policies between pm and p122, another sixth
with ideal policies between p123 and pr and the last sixth with ideal policies
above pr. Then C∗ = {l,m, r} and sincere support by every citizen is still a
Sincere-Strategic equilibrium.
12Formally: (ii) For all i ∈ C,
bPr[Wi = 1|C] +
X
j∈C
|vi(pi)− vi(pj)|(Pr[Wj = 1|C\i]− Pr[Wj = 1|C]) > c.
13 If the three candidates stand an equal chance of victory, the utility for citizen 62 is
− 0.2+0.1+0.4
3
= −0.233. If citizen 62 votes for l, the utility for citizen 62 is approximately
−0.2 ∗ 0.805− 0.1 ∗ 0.014− 0.4 ∗ 0.181 = −0.235.
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Equilibria with four candidates may have one or two competitive candidates,
as in Besley and Coate, or three or four, as in Osborne and Slivinski. However,
if we consider the refinement of a Sincere-Strategic Equilibrium, then we find
that spoilers must all be in between two competitive candidates. Therefore,
equilibria with a single competitive candidate will not be Sincere-Strategic.
Lemma 6 In any Sincere-Strategic equilibrium with multiple candidates, if i ∈
C is a spoiler, then there exist j, h ∈ C such that pi ∈ (pj , ph).
Corollary 7 In any Sincere-Strategic equilibrium with two or more candidates,
there exist at least two competitive candidates.
If preferences are Euclidean we can show that if the electorate is suﬃciently
large, then all candidates will have a similar support. We consider a sequence of
societies of increasing size N and we show that the result holds for all societies
larger than some size n. To prove this we need to add a technical assumption:
Assumption 4 There exists a set Q ⊂ [0, 1] composed of finitely many points
such that for all N and for all i ∈ N, pi ∈ Q. Furthermore, for any q, q0 ∈ Q,
q+q0
2 /∈ Q.
Assumption 4 guarantees that the number of distinct ideal policies is bounded
as the size of the electorate approaches infinity. The second part of the assump-
tion holds generically: if the points in Q are randomly chosen between zero and
one, the probability that the midpoint between two of them is also chosen is
zero.
With this extra assumption we can show that if agents have Euclidean pref-
erences, then in any SS equilibrium with a large electorate all candidates receive
an approximately equal share of support.
Proposition 8 Suppose that preferences are Euclidean and suppose that Min-
imal Support and Assumption 4 hold. Then, for any positive  there exists a
positive integer n s.t. if N > n, in any Sincere Strategic equilibrium SiSj > 1− 
for all i, j ∈ C∗.
The intuition for the proof is as follows: If the electorate is large enough, a
candidate whose share of support is less than that of the strongest candidates
will lose with probability approaching one. Then, by Lemma 6 and Corollary
7, it must be that this weak candidate is a spoiler, between two competitive
candidates. But then, given two competitive candidates and a trailing weak
candidate, votes for the spoiler are wasted votes, and only citizens who are in-
diﬀerent among the top two candidates will support the spoiler. We have ruled
out (non-generic) indiﬀerence between two candidates with distinct ideal poli-
cies by assumption and as a result the spoiler will get no votes. According to
Minimal Support, citizens with no support don’t run as candidates. Note that
Minimal Support, rather mild in the case of equilibria with two candidates, now
has stronger implications. In particular, Minimal Support rules out equilibria
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in which a candidate with zero support runs because if she dropped out, the oﬀ-
equilibrium path strategies of other citizens are such that the support to other
candidates would change and thus, even with zero supporters, the candidate
aﬀects the outcome of the election. A high enough cost of running that deters
entry by candidates with only a negligible chance of victory is enough to satisfy
Minimal Support. Alternatively, we can interpret Minimal Support as a restric-
tion on the class of strategy profiles that agents can play. It is diﬃcult to justify
why agents would change their support after a candidate that no one supports
drops out. It is more plausible that the strategy profiles played in equilibria are
such that the entry decision of a citizen who no one supports is irrelevant to the
outcome of the election. If so, our Minimal Support assumption is satisfied.
A complete characterization of multi-candidate equilibria is beyond the scope
of this paper.
4 Conclusion and Extensions
We have introduced a model of representative democracy with endogenous can-
didates and uncertainty about the total vote count. We predict that the median
will be able to run a successful, unopposed campaign only if the number of citi-
zens is small and odd. If the number of citizens is even or the electorate is large,
no citizen can run unopposed and a two-candidate equilibrium will exist.
In a model with a finite electorate, strategic voting, no uncertainty and a
large benefit from holding oﬃce, two-candidate equilibria generically do not ex-
ist if the number of citizens is odd, whereas they exist if N is even. Introducing
uncertainty, we match these results for a small electorate, but in a large elec-
torate we find that the exact number of citizens is irrelevant and there always
exist a two-candidate equilibrium if the benefit from holding oﬃce is at least
twice as high as the cost of running.
We have introduced a refined equilibrium concept, Sincere-Strategic Equi-
librium, which requires the equilibrium set of candidates to hold regardless of
whether citizens choose which candidate to support strategically or sincerely,
and requires the equilibrium of the entry stage to be robust to coalitional de-
viations from strategic to sincere decision-making rules. We show that if there
exists a Sincere-Strategic equilibrium with two candidates, the candidates can-
not be too extreme, but one will lean to the left and the other one to the
right; thus, policies do not converge to the median. We show a set of suﬃcient
conditions for this equilibrium to exist.
With certain restrictions on the strategies used by the citizens, the refined
equilibrium concept rules out all multi-candidate equilibria in which some can-
didates run with little support. If equilibria with three or more candidates exist,
then all candidates must have a similar share of support.
We now compare our results with those of the two most prominent models of
representative democracy with endogenous candidates: Osborne and Slivinski’s
(1996) and Besley and Coate’s (1997).
Besley and Coate consider a finite number of strategic citizens. Candidates
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perfectly anticipate the outcome of the election, which depends crucially on the
exact (odd or even) number of citizens: Assuming that the benefit of holding
oﬃce is large, single candidate equilibria exist if the median is unique14 and two
candidate equilibria exist if the number of citizens is even. This model best fits
an election with a very small electorate. With such an electorate, our model
yields similar results: Single candidate equilibria exist if the median is unique
and two-candidate equilibria exist if the number of citizens is even.
It is reasonable that the exact number of citizens determines the equilib-
rium outcome in a society with a very small electorate, but it is a less plausible
prediction in a society with a large electorate. We have shown that the un-
certainty in our model makes the exact number of citizens irrelevant in large
societies: Equilibria with a single candidate will not exist, and equilibria with
two candidates will exist. The key diﬀerence between our model and Besley and
Coate’s is that under uncertainty about the vote count, a candidate trailing by
a small margin in terms of expected votes will have a high enough probability of
victory if the electorate is large enough and therefore this candidate will choose
to run. If the election was deterministic, no citizen could successfully challenge
the median.
Our result for large electorate reinforces the findings of Osborne and Slivin-
ski, who reach a similar prediction under a number of simplifying assumptions
(sincere voting, a continuum of voters, Euclidean preferences). Their model is
bound to fit large electorates better than small ones, for it relies on the existence
of an infinite number of voters.
Our model with a finite number of voters thus builds a bridge between
the two main models of representative democracy with endogenous candidates,
agreeing with each of the two models where it is most appropriate -with Besley
and Coate for small electorates, with Osborne and Slivinski for large ones. We
blend their diﬀerent predictions into a single, unifying framework that captures
the insights of large electorates where complete information is implausible as
well as those of smaller electorates where the outcome is easier for all agents to
foresee.
For future research, we would like to introduce not just endogenous candi-
dates, but endogenous parties into the model: Some citizens choose to join a
party, and the party chooses to field a candidate. Parties could be just coordi-
nation devices between citizens, or they could be cost-sharing devices that help
to fund the campaign of the candidate they field.
5 Appendix
5.1 Lemma 1
Proof. If N is even, both ml and mh will have at least a 50% chance of victory
against any other citizen in a two-candidate race. Thus b > 2c guarantees that
they will both be willing to run against any single candidate, thus no citizen
14Or if there exist a Condorcet winner if the policy space is not unidimensional.
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may stand unopposed. The same argument applies to all the medians if N is
odd and the median is not unique.
If N is odd and the median is unique, the median would run against any
other citizen who was standing alone, so no citizen other than the median can
run unopposed.
If N is odd and the unique median m was running, then any other citizen
j ∈ N would run against the median if and only if
(b+ vj(pj)− vj(pm)) Pr[Wj = 1|C = {m, j}] > c.
For every j ∈ N such that if j and m run, the cutting point in support is in
(pm−k−1, pm−k)∪(pm+k, pm+k+1), the excess support of the median is Sm−Sj =
2k + 1, thus the probability of victory for j is
1
2
fmj(2k + 1) + (1− Fmj(2k + 1)).
For any j ∈ N such that if j and m run the cutting point in support is pm−k or
pm+k for some k, the excess support of the median is Sm − Sj = 2k, thus the
probability of victory for j is 12fmj(2k) + (1− Fmj(2k)).
5.2 Theorem 1
Proof. The only single candidate equilibrium is that in which a unique median
is running (Lemma 1). Now suppose the next citizen, m+ 1, should challenge
the median. Then the diﬀerence in support is 1 and the probability that the
weaker candidate m+ 1 wins is 12fm,m+1(1) + 1−Fm,m+1(1), which is equal to
1− 1
2
fm,m+1(1)− fm,m+1(0)− Fm,m+1(−1).
As N tends to infinity, fi,j(x) converges to zero for any given integer x, in par-
ticular for fm,m+1(1) and fm,m+1(0), so the probability of victory for candidate
m+ 1 and the expression (1− Fm,m+1(−1)) converge to the same value. Since
the median has more support, the probability that the median loses less votes
than the other candidate is less than a half, so Fm,m+1(−1) < 12 for all N, and
(1 − Fm,m+1(−1)) > 12 for all N. Since the probability that m + 1 wins is less
than one half for all N, but it converges to the same value as (1−Fm,m+1(−1)),
it must be that both converge to 12 . Then given b > 2c, citizen m + 1 will run
against the median if the electorate is big enough.
5.3 Theorem 2
Proof. If N is odd andm andm+1 run in a two candidate race, the probability
of winning converges to a half for each candidate as the number of citizens
increases. Given b > 2c, both candidates want to run if the probability of
victory is close enough to one half.
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If instead N is even, then ml and mh can run against each other in equilib-
rium regardless of the size of the society, for they each have a one half probability
of victory.
Entry by a third candidate is deterred by the No Lone Supporter assumption,
which guarantees that there exists an equilibrium support strategy such that no
citizen would support the entrant, and the Minimal Support assumption, which
guarantees that no citizen would want to enter the race if she was not going to
get a single supporter.
5.4 Proposition 2
Proof. By the No Lone Supporter assumption, if N ≥ 6, no two citizens can
have the same ideal policy. Suppose three citizens l, l0, l” shared a common
ideal policy. Then if C = {l, l0, l”}, it would be a best response for any fourth
citizen to support any of the three regardless of the support strategies by all
other citizens, which contradicts No Lone Supporter. Suppose there are just two
citizens l, l0 with a common ideal policy and suppose N ≥ 6, then there exist
two citizens k, k0 either such that pk ≤ pk0 < pl, or such that pk ≥ pk0 > pl. In
either case if C = {l, l0, k0}, the best response for k is to support k0 regardless of
the strategies of the other citizens, again in contradiction of No Lone Supporter.
Therefore, if No Lone Supporter holds and N ≥ 6, for any i, j ∈ N such that
i < j, it must be pi < pj .
Thus, if bpij > pL, then L and every other citizen l with pl ≤ pL support i
and i has at least L supporters. Since L = q( cb+vi(pi)−vi(pj) ), the probability
that i wins is
Pr[Wi = 1|C = {i, j}] ≥ cb+ vi(pi)− vi(pj) .
Citizen i chooses to run if the expected benefit of running oﬀsets the cost of
entry. The expected benefit of running is:
[b+vi(pi)−vi(pj)] Pr[Wi = 1|C = {i, j}] ≥ [b+vi(pi)−vi(pj)] cb+ vi(pi)− vi(pj) = c
Thus, citizen i wants to run.
Similarly, if bpij < pH , then H and every other citizen h with ph ≥ pH
support j and consequently i has less than H supporters. Thus, the probability
that i wins is less than 1− cb+vj(pj)−vj(pi) , or equivalently, the probability that
j wins is more than cb+vj(pj)−vj(pi) . Therefore, j also wants to run:
[b+vj(pj)−vj(pi)] Pr[Wj = 1|C = {i, j}] > [b+vj(pj)−vj(pi)] cb+ vj(pj)− vj(pi) = c.
Under the No Lone Supporter assumption, the following support strategy is
an equilibrium of the support stage: For any configuration C of candidates such
that {i, j} ∈ C, every citizen supports the candidate in {i, j} she prefers most,
and no citizen supports any other candidate.
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With this support strategy, an entrant would always receive zero votes from
the rest of the electorate. The Minimal Support assumption is then suﬃcient
to guarantee that no third candidate will join the race between i and j.
Therefore, if bpij ∈ (pL, pH) there exists an equilibrium in which i and j run,
and the rest of citizens would never support a third entrant.
If bpij < pL, then:
[b+vi(pi)−vi(pj)] Pr[Wi = 1|C = {i, j}] < [b+vi(pi)−vi(pj)] cb+ vi(pi)− vi(pj) = c
and i would not want to run against j; if bpij > pH , then j would not want to
run against i:
[b+vj(pj)−vj(pi)] Pr[Wj = 1|C = {i, j}] ≤ [b+vj(pj)−vj(pi)] cb+ vj(pj)− vj(pi) = c.
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Without No Indiﬀerence, bpij = pL is also possible. Since no two citizens
share the same ideal policy, if bpij = pL, then L−1 citizens support i, L abstains
and N − L support j. From the construction of L we know that if L citizens
support i and N − L support j, i is willing to run, but if L − 1 support i and
N −L+1 support j, then i prefers to drop out of the race. Therefore, bpij ≥ pL
is necessary and bpij > pL suﬃcient for i to be willing to run.
5.5 Example 1
Citizens will want to run if their chance of victory is better than 10% just out of
motivation to hold oﬃce, and depending on who else is running, they may want
to run for a chance of victory slightly less than 10%, out of policy considerations.
No citizen wishes to run for a probability of victory of less than 9%.
If the two top candidates split support 49-51 or 48-50, the weaker candidate
has more than 10.5% probability of victory, thus he is willing to run, but with
a split of 48-51 or worse (trailing by three or more supporters), the weaker
candidate has a probability of victory below 5% and would not want to run.
With just two candidates i and j, where we let i be the lower candidate, citizens
split support 49-51 if i+ j adds up to 98, 99 (in which case i gets support from
citizens 1 to 49), 102 and 103 (in which case citizens 50 and 51 support i as
well). Citizens split support 50-50 if i+ j adds up to 100 or 101.
Thus in order for i and j to be willing to run against each other, it must be
98 ≤ i+ j ≤ 103.
However, if j is 50, or 51, then a third candidate h = 52 could enter and get
49 supporters (if citizens happen to be sincere), enough to make h competitive.
If j = 52 and i = 49, 50 or 51, then l = 48 could enter and get at least 48
15To be rigorous, we need to add that if bpij ∈ (pH , pH+1), it could be that [b + vj(pj) −
vj(pi)] Pr[Wj = 1|C = {i, j}] = c. If so, citizen j has no incentives to run, but being indiﬀerent,
j could decide to run against i. As this is an uninteresting knife-edge case, we have omitted
it from the statements of Proposition 2 and Footnote 11.
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supporters under sincere support, leaving i with 1 or 2, and j with no more
than 50. Then l would enter. If j = 52 and i < 49, then h = 53 could enter and
get 48 supporters, leaving i with no more than 50 and j with 2 or 3. Then h
would run.
Therefore, it cannot be that j is less than 53. And if j = 53, then i cannot
be less than 47, or else h = 54 with 47 supporters would enter and face i with
no more than 49 (j would keep the support of citizens 50, 51 and 52).
Similarly, if i is 49 or 50, then l = 48 could enter and get 48 votes, enough
to be competitive against the (no more than 50) votes of j.
If i = 48 and j = 53, then outflanking is no longer viable for a third candi-
date: If l = 47 enters, then l gets 47 votes and j gets 50.
So besides adding up to 98, 99, 100, 101, 102 or 103, it must be that either
i, j /∈ {48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53} or (i, j) ∈ {(47, 53), (48, 53)}.
Finally, i and j cannot be too far apart, or else a moderate citizen will enter:
If j− i is more than 64, then either ml = 50 or mh = 51 could enter and get
no less than 33 supporters and leave the other two candidates with 33 and 34
supporters (or 34 and 33). In such a tight three-way race, the probability that
the weakest candidate wins the election is over 10%.
5.6 Suﬃcient conditions for existence of two-candidate SS
Equilibria:
Let η = min
{x}
x s.t. b2fij(x)+ bFij(x−1) > c. That is, η is the maximum amount
of support by which a candidate i could be trailing in a two candidate race and
still be motivated to run solely for the expected benefit of holding oﬃce.
Let I be the smallest convex interval containing the ideal policies of at least
η citizens.
Assumption 5 Any convex interval I 0 ⊆ [0, 1] weakly larger than I contains
the ideal policy of at least 1 agent.
Let bxc denote the largest integer smaller or equal to x and let dxe denote
the smallest integer equal or larger than x.We use this notation in the following
condition, which guarantees that the distribution of ideal policies is not too
lopsided near the median.
Assumption 6 There exist a rational number ϕ > 0 such that for all N, pm is
closer to pbm−ϕNc than to pbN−3ϕNc and also pm is closer to pdm+ϕNe than to
pd3ϕNe.
The interpretation of this condition is that cannot be that the ideal policies
of almost a half of the population lie within some distance to the left of the ideal
policy of the median, whereas within the same distance to right of the median
lie very few ideal policies, nor can it be that there are a lot of ideal policies just
to the right of the median and very few just to the left.
Let c∗ = max
i,j,l∈N
|vi(pj)− vi(pl)| for all i, j, l.
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Euclidean preferences are defined by the Euclidean distance between the
ideal policy of the agent and the implemented policy: vi(p) = |p− pi|.
Claim 9 Suppose preferences are Euclidean, Assumptions 5 and 6 hold and c >
c∗. There exist some n such that if N > n, then a Sincere Strategic Equilibrium
with two candidates exists.
Proof. For notational simplicity, suppose η is even and ϕN is an integer.
Without loss of generality suppose that pm is closer to pm+ϕN than to pm−ϕN
is. Then let i = m− ϕN.
Now construct the interval D = [pm+pm− η2 −pm−ϕN , pm+pm+ η2 −pm−ϕN ].
Since this interval is of length pm+ η2 − pm− η2 , it is weakly larger than I, thus by
Assumption 5, it contains the ideal policy of at least one agent. If pm+ϕN ∈ D,
then let j = m + ϕN. If pm+ϕN /∈ D, then let j be the left-most agent with
an ideal policy in D. Since pm+ϕN − pm < pm − pm−ϕN , it follows that if
pm+ϕN /∈ D, then pj > pm+ϕN . In either case, pj ≥ pm+ϕN and
bpij ∈ [pm + pm− η2
2
,
pm + pm+ η2
2
] ⊂ [pm− η2 , pm+ η2 ],
and thus, the diﬀerence in support for the two candidates is less than η. Then
i and j, by definition of η, want to run against each other.
Now we show that no other agent would want to enter the race:
A candidate to the left of pi would get at most m − ϕN votes, whereas j
would get no less than m− η2 . The ratio of their share of supporters is
1−2ϕ
2 N
1
2N−
1
2η
=
(1−2ϕ)N
N−η =
1−2ϕ
1− ηN
which converges to 1 − 2ϕ < 1, since ηN converges to zero.
Given a fixed ratio of support between two candidates, the probability that the
candidate with the lesser support wins converges to zero. So a candidate to the
left of i will not win if N is suﬃciently large. c > c∗ guarantees that sure losers
don’t run.
Similarly for a candidate that tried to outflank j instead.
Now, a centrist candidate between i and j will collect at most the support
of all citizens between pi and pj , that is, 2ϕN if j = pm+ϕN or ϕN and all the
votes of citizens with ideal policies in (pm, pm+pm−η2 −pm−ϕN ] otherwise. But
(pm, pm + pm− η2 − pm−ϕN ] ⊂ [pm, 2pm − pm−ϕN ]. By Assumption 6,
2pm − pm−ϕN = pm + pm − pm−ϕN < pm + pN−3ϕN − pm = pN−3ϕN
and thus there are no more than N2 − 3ϕN agents with an ideal policy in
(pm, pm + pm− η2 − pm−ϕN ]. So the centrist entrant gathers a total number
of supports which is less than N2 − 2ϕN. Since i gathers at least
N
2 − ϕN sup-
porters, their ratio of support is 1−4ϕ1−2ϕ which is less than 1, so the probability
that the centrist entrant wins converges to zero. Then c > c∗ guarantees that
the entrant doesn’t run.
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5.7 Lemma 6
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose i is a spoiler and i is the left-most candidate
and let the second left-most candidate be j. If every citizen chooses support
sincerely and i drops out of the race, all the support for i switches to support
for j. The probability that i wins the election is now zero, the probability
that j wins increases, and the probability that any of the other candidates
wins is reduced. Since vi(pj) ≥ vi(pk) for any candidate k /∈ {i, j}, it followsP
k∈C\i
vi(pk)
Pr[Wk=1|C]
Pr[Wi=0|C] ≤
P
h∈C\i
vi(ph) Pr[Wh = 1|C\i].
Since i is a spoiler,
{b+ vi(pi)−
X
k∈C\i
vi(pk) Pr[Wk = 1|C\i]}Pr[Wi = 1|C] < c.
Thus:
Pr[Wi = 1|C]{b+ vi(pi)−
X
k∈C\i
vi(pk) Pr[Wk = 1|C\i]}
+Pr[Wi = 0|C]{
X
k∈C\i
vi(pk)
Pr[Wk = 1|C]
Pr[Wi = 0|C] −
X
k∈C\i
vi(pk) Pr[Wk = 1|C\i]} < c.
But the left term in the last inequality is just another form of writing the left
term in the inequality in condition (i) in Remark 5, which ought to be bigger
than c in order for i to be willing to run, thus i cannot be part of an equilibrium
with sincere support behavior, thus it cannot be part of a Sincere-Strategic
equilibrium.
5.8 Proposition 8
Proof. For two candidates: If i, j ∈ C have diﬀerent support, it must be
they have diﬀerent ideal policies. Then, given Assumption 4 and Euclidean
preferences, every citizen supports either i or j (no indiﬀerence). Suppose Sj ≤
(1 − )Si. Then Si ≥ 12−N and Sj ≤
1−
2−N. Note that Vl follows a binomial
distribution Bi[Sl, 1 − µ] for l = i, j. By the Weak Law of Large Numbers, ViSi
and VjSj converge to 1−µ. Therefore,
Vi
Vj
converges to SiSj , which is by assumption
more than one. Therefore, with probability converging to one as N approaches
infinity, i receives more valid votes and wins the election. For a suﬃciently low
probability of victory, j prefers not to run as candidate.
For three candidates: Let C = {i, j, h}, where Si ≥ Sj ≥ Sh. Suppose
Sh ≤ Si(1− ). By the previous argument with two candidates, the probability
that h wins converges to zero. Thus for a large enough N, h has to be a
spoiler. By Lemma 1, it must then be that ph ∈ (pi, pj) where both i and j
are competitive candidates. In order for j to be competitive, j must win with
some positive probability γ16 . Since Vi converges to (1−µ)Si and Vj converges
16We can derive the exact expression of γ from Definition 3, but we don’t need it for the
proof.
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to (1− µ)Sj , it must then be that Sj is itself converging to Si as N approaches
infinity. We next show that the probability that given that two candidates tie
for victory one of the two is h converges to zero. Let δ be an arbitrarily small,
positive number such that δ < 2 . Let ∆ = [1− δ, 1 + δ]
The probability that h ties for victory or wins by one vote is:
Pr[
Vh
Vi
∈ ∆] Pr[Vh − Vi ∈ {0, 1}|VhVi ∈ ∆] Pr[Vh > Vj |Vh − Vi ∈ {0, 1}]
+Pr[
Vh
Vj
∈ ∆] Pr[Vh − Vj ∈ {0, 1}|VhVj ∈ ∆] Pr[Vh > Vi|Vh − Vj ∈ {0, 1}].
The probability that i and j tie for victory is:
Pr[
Vj
Vi
∈ ∆] Pr[Vj = Vi|VjVi ∈ ∆] Pr[Vj > Vh|Vj = Vh].
Let Λ1 = Pr[VhVi ∈ ∆] Pr[Vh > Vj |Vh− Vi ∈ {0, 1}], let Λ2 = Pr[VhVj ∈ ∆] Pr[Vh >
Vi|Vh − Vj ∈ {0, 1}], let Λ3 = Pr[VjVi ∈ ∆] Pr[Vj > Vh|Vj = Vh]. Using this
notational shortcut, the ratio of the probability that h ties for victory over the
probability that i and j tie for victory is:
Λ1 Pr[Vh − Vi ∈ {0, 1}|VhVi ∈ ∆] + Λ2 Pr[Vh − Vj ∈ {0, 1}|VhVj ∈ ∆]
Λ3 Pr[Vj = Vi|VjVi ∈ ∆]
.
Since Λ1 and Λ2 converge to zero and Λ3 converges to one as N approaches
infinity, and
Pr[Vh − Vi ∈ {0, 1}|VhVi ∈ ∆]
Pr[Vj = Vi|VjVi ∈ ∆]
and
Pr[Vh − Vj ∈ {0, 1}|VhVj ∈ ∆]
Pr[Vj = Vi|VjVi ∈ ∆]
are bounded, the previous ratio converges to zero. Therefore, given that a
single vote is decisive, the probability that it is decisive to determine whether
i or j wins converges to one, and for a large enough N, supporting h is wasted
support. Only citizens whose ideal policy is at a very small distance from bpij
will support h. Let d be such that any citizen with an ideal policy at a distance
more than d from bpij would strategically support i or j, not h. As N approaches
infinity, this distance d converges to zero, the ideal policy of an h supporter has
to converge to bpij . Let q0 and q” be the two points in Q closest to pi+pj2 such
that q0 < pi+pj2 < q”. If N is large enough, [bpij − d, bpij + d] ∈ (q0, q”) and no
citizen will support h. Then, by the Minimal Support assumption, h prefers to
drop out than to run with no supporters.
For more than three candidates: Suppose first that there are two competitive
candidates with distinct ideal policies17 . If the electorate is suﬃciently large,
17There cannot be an equilibrium in which two or more candidates have a common ideal
policy and one other candidate doesn’t, because if so strategic citizens would concentrate their
support in only one of the candidates with the same policy, and the others would drop out if
they had no supporters.
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any candidate with support less than (1− ) times the support of the strongest
candidate will have to be a spoiler between the two competitive candidates
(Corollary 7), and the probability that a single vote for the spoiler aﬀects the
election given that a single vote is pivotal converges to zero. Therefore, by the
same arguments as with three candidates, only citizens who are indiﬀerent or
close to indiﬀerent about the two competitive candidates would support the
spoiler. Eventually, there are no citizens with an ideal policy so close to the
midpoint of the ideal policies of the competitive candidates, and then the spoiler
who receives no votes drops out of the race. Suppose there are three or more
competitive candidates and a weak candidate with support less than (1−) times
the support of the strongest candidate. With Euclidean policies, no citizen can
be simultaneously indiﬀerent about three distinct policies. If the size of the
electorate is large enough, the probability that a vote for the weakest candidate
is decisive given that a vote is decisive is arbitrarily close to zero. Then, no
citizen will support the weakest candidate, and this candidate will drop out,
again by the Minimal Support assumption.
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